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Olivier Godechot (Sciences Po, MaxPo and OSC-CNRS, Axa Chair Holder) and Claudia Senik (University 
Paris-Sorbonne and Paris School of Economics) 
 
November 13, 2013 
 
This paper looks at the association between wage satisfaction and different notions of reference wage, 
based on a matched employer-employee dataset. It shows that workers’ satisfaction depends on other-
people’s income in different ways. Relative income concerns are important, but we also find robust 
evidence of signal effects. For instance, workers are happier the higher the median wage in their firm, 
holding their own wage constant. This is true of all employees, whatever their relative position in the firm. 
This signal effect is stronger for young people and for women. These findings are based on objective 
measures of earnings as well as subjective declarations about wage satisfaction, awareness of other 
people’s wage and reported income comparisons. 
Key-words: Income comparisons, income distribution, job satisfaction, wage satisfaction, signal effect, 
matched employer-employee survey data.  
JEL codes: D31, D63, I30, J28, J31 
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1. Introduction 
Since the early work by Cappelli and Sherer (1988), the extent to which workers make income 
comparisons has been shown to influence their pay satisfaction. Relative income concerns have also been 
shown to influence workers’ choices, such as their supply of work-hours (working longer hours to “keep 
up with the Jones”) or their choice of consumption versus savings (under-saving to “keep up with the 
Jones”). If workers’ motivation and engagement depend on their relative wage, taking care of 
distributional concerns should be an integral part of human resources management inside firms. Relative 
income concerns are also bound to change the view social scientists take on the sources of individual well-
being, in particular well-being at work. 
Essentially, three types of channels have been shown to relate firms’ wage grids to workers’ satisfaction:  
(i) General aversion to inequality, i.e. workers prefer narrow wage grids and they both dislike to earn more 
and to earn less than their reference group; (ii) Aversion to relative deprivation (Stouffer, 1949; Runciman, 
1966), also called status effect: workers dislike earning less than their reference group and may enjoy 
earning more; (iii) Signal effects (Hirschman and Rothschild, 1973): workers use other people’s wage as a 
signal of their own future prospects, hence they like to work in organizations where other people’s wages 
are high. 
Thanks to the increasing availability of large datasets that include subjective satisfaction judgments, a 
voluminous literature has endeavored to show empirical evidence of these effects. Using self-declared 
satisfaction as the outcome, the idea is to estimate a satisfaction equation depending on a Reference 
income. But what is the relevant notion of Reference income? To find out, researchers have typically 
constructed different measures of what they thought could be the typical income one’s reference group, 
and tested for their relevance. For example, for each respondent in a survey, they calculate the average pay 
of professional alter egos, injected this notion of Reference income in the estimate of job satisfaction, life 
satisfaction or pay satisfaction, controlling for individual circumstances, and looked at the coefficient 
associated with Reference income to check whether it was statistically significant and what its sign was.  
However, the information on the actual social environment of individuals is most often unavailable. Clark 
et al. (2009) is one of the rare exceptions, as they were able to merge the Danish sample of the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) with administrative records. The British Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey is also a matched employer-employee dataset, but it is not exhaustive (see Brown et al. 
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3 
2008). A recent randomized experiment was set up by Card et al. (2010), showing evidence of relative 
concerns among employees of the public universities of California when they had access to internet 
information about the wage of their actual colleagues. This paper is thus one of the first attempts to match 
a survey of employees that includes a great number of subjective attitudes with an exhaustive 
administrative database about employees of all private firms and organizations. 
We match a French survey of wage earners (SALSA, 2009) with a file of the social insurance organization 
(DADS) that contains the work hours and wages for all employees of the private sector as well as local 
administration and hospital civil servants, as declared by their employer. For each surveyed individual, 
SALSA elicited a series of opinions and satisfaction statements, notably wage satisfaction as well as the 
direction and intensity of income comparisons. Using the DADS 2008 file, for each individual, we 
construct a number of objective measures that are candidates to act as Reference income benchmarks, 
within each respondents’ firm and in general. We then explore the association between wage satisfaction 
and these notions of Reference income. We are interested in two main questions: (i) How do employees 
appreciate the distribution of wages inside their firm or establishment, e.g. how does their wage 
satisfaction vary with the lowest, highest and medium wage in their firm? (ii) What is the most relevant 
notion of Reference income? Within firms, both signal and status effects are at work. Employees’ wage 
satisfaction increases with the medium level of wage in their establishment, and with the pay level of the 
top quartile, but decrease when the wage of the top 1% best paid employees rises. Signal effects are 
stronger for younger people below 35 and weaker for elder workers over 50. Finally, employees’ wage 
satisfaction rises with their rank in the wage distribution of their firm. Concerning wage comparisons, the 
most relevant Reference group is made of one’s co-workers in the same broad category of occupation, in 
the same age group, in the same region and establishment. Both relative income concerns and signal 
effects are compounded by employees’ knowledge about other people’s pay and the importance that they 
declare they attach to comparisons. 
The next section briefly reviews the literature on income-based social interactions. Section 3 presents the 
data, Section 4 the identification strategy, Section 5 the results, and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature 
A large part of the “happiness” literature has tried to elicit relative income concerns by estimating 
subjective well-being regressions in which the explained variable is self-declared satisfaction, and where 
both each individual’s own income and her comparison income level appear. This literature has appealed 
to different datasets (in terms of countries and years), different measures of wellbeing (job and life 
satisfaction being the most predominant) and various measures of comparison income. In terms of 
Reference groups, researchers have mainly investigated the relevance of professional peers and local 
fellows with whom individuals interact on a regular basis, i.e. co-citizens and neighbors.  
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4 
In their seminal paper on professional Reference income, Clark and Oswald (1996) used the British 
Household Panel Survey, calculated the income of ‘people like me’ from a wage equation, and showed 
that this is negatively correlated with individual job satisfaction, controlling for own income (which 
attracts a positive coefficient). Following this route, others have uncovered similar status effects in Great-
Britain (Sloane and Williams 2000) and in other countries, such as Sweden (Bygren 2004), Canada (Lévy-
Garboua and Montmarquette 2004), Germany (Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005), Europe (Senik 2008) and 
China (Gao and Smyth 2010; Clark and Senik 2012); see Warr (2007), for a survey.  
Other work has explored the local dimension of Reference income, in the United States (McBride 2001, 
Blanchflower and Oswald 2004, Luttmer 2005), Canada (Helliwell and Huang, 200), Germany (Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2005), Europe (Caporale, et al. 2009; Mishra et al. 2010), Latin America (Graham and Felton 
2006), Nepal (Fafchamps and Shilpi 2008), India (Fontaine-Carrion and Yamada 2012), China (Knight and 
Gunatilaka 2010a and 2010b), South-Africa (Kingdon and Knight 2007); Ethiopia (Akay and Martinson, 
2011); Malawi (Ravallion and Lokshin 2010). All find evidence of relative income concerns, i.e. a negative 
association between satisfaction and local reference income.  
Some authors have included subjective comparison questions in surveys. It generally appears that 
subjectively elicited comparisons work in the sense of relative income concerns rather than signal effect. 
Such surveys have been run in the Netherlands (Melenberg 1992), the USA (McBride 2001), Germany 
(Mayraz et al. 2010), Transition countries (Senik 2009), Europe (Clark and Senik 2010) and China (Knight 
and Gunatilaka 2011; Knight and Song 2006). 
One of the findings of this literature is the difference between within-firm and outside-firm benchmarks. 
In the above-mentioned paper, Cappelli and Sherer (1988) studied job satisfaction in a major American 
airline company, and found that the equivalent outside market wage, calculated for each of the 19 
different jobs and seniority levels at the carrier, has a negative effect on pay satisfaction, controlling for 
individual wage and other job characteristics. In the same vein, Bygren (2004) combined several Swedish 
data sources to construct several notions of Reference income, and found that workers’ satisfaction 
depends negatively on the typical income of others in the same occupation and others in the labor market 
at large, rather than other co-workers in the same firm. In his seminal work, Runciman (1966) had already 
underlined the importance to distinguish relative deprivation within one’s group, versus on behalf of one’s 
group. 
In spite of the evidence about “others as negatives” (Luttmer, 2005), some researchers have considered 
the possibility that other people’s income may exert a positive influence on individual well-being if they 
play the role of a signal, as underlined by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973). Senik (2004 and 2008) has 
provided evidence of Hirschman-type information effects in high mobility/uncertainty countries such as 
Russia, the new Europe (Hungary, Poland, the Baltic states) and the United States. She showed that in 
these countries, individual life satisfaction is positively related to the income of others with the same 
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5 
professional characteristics. This contrasts with a negative impact of reference income defined in the same 
way in 15 countries of the “Old Europe”. Using linked employer-employee Danish panel data, Clark et al. 
(2009) provided evidence of signal effects outweighing status effects within firms: Job satisfaction rises 
with co-workers’ wages. Clark and Senik (2010) also find evidence of signal effects in Europe. Studies that 
uncovered signal effects also found that the latter are particularly strong for young people. Obviously, the 
professional future of the young is both more uncertain and longer, and young people in their early career 
may have more reasons to expect a promotion than senior employees: for these reasons, the signal is likely 
to be of higher value to their eyes. Accordingly, other papers have underlined the life cycle variation in the 
intensity of status and signal effects (FitzRoy et al. 2011, Akay and Martinsson 2012).  
Beyond the impact of relative income, a few studies have shown evidence that self-reported wellbeing 
depends upon the objective ordinal rank of an individual’s wage within a comparison group, such as her 
firm. Brown et al. (2008), for instance, showed that the normalized rank of an employee in the firm’s wage 
distribution was a powerful predictor of her satisfaction. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) also showed that 
the objective rank of an individual in the ward where she lives (in Nepal) has a statistically significant 
positive impact on her satisfaction concerning the adequacy of her consumption level. The difference 
between rank concerns and relative income concerns is that the former is a comparison with the entire 
distribution of wages in one’s establishment. It is likely that the rank occupied by an individual is 
associated with a symbolic value, and possibly power and prestige. 
In this paper, we test for the relevance and importance of all these different effects, i.e. status, signal, rank 
effects, and life-cycle effects. We use both constructed measures of reference income based on objective 
information and subjective attitudes elicited in our survey. 
3. Data 
We use two French datasets that we match. The first one comes from a survey that was ran in 2009 
among 3000 French employees, with a special interest in the way they perceive their wage (SALSA, Les 
salaires vus par les salariés). The survey was funded by the Corpus program of the French National Research 
Agency (ANR). It was ran by the French statistical office (INSEE). Interviews were made by telephone if 
possible and in face to face otherwise.  
In order to constitute the Salsa sample, INSEE randomly extracted a first sample of 10 000 employees out 
of the 2006 DADS-Panel, Déclarations Annuelles de Données Sociales. The DADS is an administrative file 
devoted to the calculation of social contributions. It contains the wages of every wage-earner working in 
the private sector, in public hospitals and local administrations. One twelfth of the dataset (i.e. people 
born in October) is panelized. Social contributions paid by national civil servants are collected through a 
different system, and therefore the latter are not in the database.  In order to overcome the under-
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6 
representation of the public sector, the designers of the survey decided to oversample employees of public 
hospitals and local administrations. Therefore 20% of the initial sample was selected in these two groups. 
Similarly 10% of the sample was selected in the top decile of the private sector’s wage distribution. In 
order to limit the cost of the survey, the sample was drawn amongst employees living in the following 
regions: Alsace, Auvergne, Centre, Languedoc-Roussillon, Lorraine, Midi-Pyrénées, Basse-Normandie, 
Pays de Loire, Picardie and Rhône-Alpes as well as in the Essonne department (which is part of Ile-de-
France (Paris) Region). The final sample is constituted of 3117 interviews. Table A1 compares the hourly 
wage rate in the sub-sample of the DADS drawn for the SALSA survey (12.47€, first row of Table A1), in 
the entire 2008 DADS sample (12.33€ in general (second row of Table A1), and in regions where the 
SALSA sample was drawn from (11.82€, third row of Table A1). It must be underlined that in the SALSA 
survey, the wage is declared by employees (“what is your monthly net wage, including complements and bonuses”), 
whereas in the DADS, the wage is declared by the employer. The former (10.74€) is lower than the latter 
(12.47€) for a similar sample of employees. This discrepancy owes to two reasons. First employees may 
slightly underestimate their wages, especially yearly premiums. Second, and more importantly, employees 
and employers may use different notions of working hours: employees are likely to declare the effective 
number of hours during an ordinary week (including non-paid extra hours), while employers provide the 
official number of contractual hours during the year that have been paid for. 
We matched each individual of SALSA with his own records in the DADS as of 2008 (2009 is not 
available yet) as well as with the records of all his co-workers, i.e. employees working in the same 
establishment or firm, in the DADS in 2008, i.e. 33,149,444 jobs (we count jobs rather than individuals, as 
one individual can occupy several jobs, hence appear several times in the DADS in a given year). We use 
this large dataset to calculate the relevant income distribution and Reference wage indicators for each 
employee of SALSA. Our regression sample (non missing observations) includes 2842 individuals 
surveyed by SALSA, aged 19 to 65 and equally balanced in terms of gender. 
Another caveat is that the SALSA survey has only been run in a subset of French regions and is thus 
potentially not perfectly representative of the French labor market. In particular, SALSA does not include 
the metropole surrounding Paris, the region Ile-de France, except the Essonne, that include most of the 
public administration and higher services sector, i.e. educated people, working in managerial positions and 
earning higher wages. However, it turns out that the structure of the labor force is about the same in Salsa 
as in the DADS in general. This is because the SALSA sample was oversampled with civil servants 
working in the local administration and public hospitals (17% as opposed to 10.6% in the DADS); which 
also explains the higher proportion of intermediate occupations in SALSA.    
 White collar 
managers 
Intermediate 
occupations 
Employees Blue collar 
workers 
SALSA (n = 2842) 12.3% 25.6% 33.8% 28.2%  
Panel DADS 2008 (n = 2 101 101) 13.7%  22.3%  33.0%  31.0%  
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7 
The SALSA survey includes subjective questions that ask employees whether they are aware about the 
wage of their colleagues, managers and top-management (CEOs), whether they actually compare their 
own wage to that of co-workers, friends or family members, whether they consider quitting their current 
job, etc. We use the questions that are listed in Table A3 and A4. Table 3 shows that about half of the 
respondents are satisfied with their wage; only 37% are rather unsatisfied and 9.5% are very unsatisfied. 
However, 19% estimate that their wage is insufficient to make ends meet; 58% that their wage is low given 
their productivity; 61% that it is low given their experience; 33% that it is low given their education.  
Only 3.2% of employees say they do not like their job. 16.5% consider quitting their job, and half of the 
latter would do so for a higher wage. Only 45% of employees have already asked for a wage rise. 22% 
have participated in a collective action on the job place.  
Turning to wage comparisons, 66% of respondents declare that they know the wage of some of their 
colleagues; 30% know the wage of their direct manager; 19% know the wage of their boss (CEO); 41% 
are aware of the wage of people working in the same profession in other firms; 50% declare that they do 
compare their wage to that of their colleagues in the same establishment; 48% that they compare their 
wage to family members; 21% to former schoolmates; 44% to friends, and 41% to the minimum wage 
level (SMIC).  
4. Identification 
Matching SALSA with the DADS creates the opportunity to study wage-based social interactions, using 
information about workers’ actual social environment. This allows identifying groups of workers which 
constitute more “natural” and realistic Reference groups for each worker, i.e. the average (or typical) wage 
by establishment, by firm, by occupation, by region, etc. The information contained in subjective 
questions also allows confirming the relevance of these constructed measures of Reference wage, as we 
are able to know whether respondents are actually aware about the wage of their colleagues and whether 
they actually compare to such benchmarks. 
The objective of this paper is to identify the type of social interactions that influence wage satisfaction. 
Essentially, modeling these interactions implies introducing the income of some relevant group of people 
(yit*) in the individual utility function: Uit = U(yit, yit*, C …). Assuming convexity and separability: 
• Uit = a0.ln (yit) + a1. ln(yit*) + v.C + … (1) 
Or, equivalently, 
• Uit = b0.ln (yit) + b1. ln(yit/yit* ) + … = b0.ln (yit) + b1. ( ln yit – ln yit* ) + v.C  + … (2) 
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8 
In the absence of any social interactions, we expect the estimated parameter a1 (or b1) to be equal to zero, 
i.e. once the employee’s own wage is taken into account, the gap between his pay and some other people’s 
pay does not matter.  However, relative concerns imply that the well-being of individual i at time t rises 
both with his own income, yit (conformingly with the indirect utility function) and with the distance to a 
comparison benchmark: hence a1 < 0 (or b1 > 0) . 
More subtle approaches of relative income concerns lead to slightly different predictions. Firstly, 
comparisons may not be symmetric, in the sense that, as assumed by Duesenberry (1949), upward 
comparisons matter more than downward ones. To test for this hypothesis, one must reformulate the 
wage satisfaction equation in the following way:  
• Uit = U(yit, yit* …)  
     = c0.ln(yit) + c1 . [ ln (yit ) – ln(yit*)].( yit≤ yit*) + c2 . [ln(yit)- ln(yit*)].( yit > yit*) + … (3) 
• Duesenberry’s conjecture predicts that: c1 > c2 ≥ 0  
It can also be the case that individuals have a general aversion for wage gaps and dislike earning more than 
their reference group as much as earning less. This can be because they are subject to feelings of guilt (in 
the first case) as well as relative deprivation (in the second case) or because they have a pure preference 
for equal outcomes. Other motivations, such as fairness and reciprocity can lead to the same result (in 
favorable cases). In this case, the prediction is that estimates of equation (3) should lead to:  c1 > 0 and    
c2 < 0. 
Finally, it is also possible that in certain situations, the income of some relevant others is interpreted as a 
signal of one’s own future prospects. In that case, we expect that the estimated coefficient a1 >0 (or b1 <0 
in equation 2), and in estimates of equation (3), both b1 and b2 should be negative; it is also likely that 
signal effect are more powerful for those whose wage is below their reference wage, hence that c1 < c2 < 
0. 
We consider different possible notions of Reference wage. First, we use within-establishment 
indicators, such as the median level of wage, the lower wage decile, the top quartile and the top centile 
within establishment (following the specification of equation 1).  
Second, we estimate several notions of Reference wage on the larger sample of the entire population of 
employees (DADS), running a sort of horse race between these different notions. More precisely, we run 
a first-stage estimate of the hourly wage rate of all employees in the DADS. The objective is to compute 
the typical income of co-workers or co-citizens sharing the same relevant productive characteristics as a 
given worker in SALSA. We then predict the typical Reference wage of each employee of SALSA; and, in 
a second-stage regression, we inject this notion of Reference wage in the estimate of the wage satisfaction 
equation (that is run amongst SALSA employees).  
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9 
In order to elicit the best notion of Reference wage, we vary the controls that are included in the first-
stage regression. We start with a minimal set of characteristics that we progressively expand. The 
arguments of the wage equation are part the following equation (4), were the α i are successively turned on 
and off in the different versions of the estimates.  
wi = α0   + α1.occupation + α2.age + α3.age2 + α4.occupation*age. + α5.occupation*age2 + α6.region (French 
département) + α7.gender + α8.age*gender + α9.age2.gender + α10.collective bargaining + α11.industry + 
α12.establishment dummy + α13.occupation*establishment + α14.firm dummy + α15.age*firm + εi (4) 
The interaction terms are meant to take into account the fact that occupation and gender do not have a 
monotonic impact along the different stages of the life cycle. Of course, we do not introduce all the 
elements of equation (4) in the same time: we start with a basic specification with only occupation 
dummies, and we introduce additional controls progressively, in order to run a sort of horse race between 
the different notions of reference wage that correspond to each specification. We select the first-stage 
regression that leads to the greater magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficient on Reference 
wage in the second-stage regression.  
Our preferred specification of the first-stage regression is displayed in Table A6 in the Appendix. It only 
includes professional characteristics, which are thought to influence satisfaction only via Reference wage, 
i.e. age, occupation, and the interactions between these categories. Table 7 shows the results of the horse 
race between different notions of Reference wage.  
Based on the first-stage regression, we predict the Reference wage of each employee (depending on his 
characteristics) and inject this measure in the estimate of the wage satisfaction equation (following 
specifications 1, 2 or 3). In principle, because Reference wage is estimated in the first stage, it must be 
treated as stochastic in the second stage estimate. However, this is not necessary in our case: we estimate 
Reference wage on an exhaustive sample that includes all the French employees in 2008, so that the 
measure can be seen as certain rather than stochastic. 
Because Reference wage is the prediction from a first-stage estimate, we must make sure that it is not 
perfectly collinear with the other controls in the regression of wage satisfaction, as represented by vector 
C in equations (1) and (2): All the (second-stage) estimates that we run include age, age square, gender, 
nationality (native or not), education, tenure, tenure square, private sector versus hospital and local 
administration. Concerning wages, in order to minimize the measurement errors that are often suspected 
to affect wage declarations in surveys, we include two measures of hourly wage in all our estimates: the 
(ln) hourly wage declared by employees in SALSA and the (ln) hourly wage declared their employer in the 
DADS. Hence, our exclusion restrictions here concern education, gender, nationality, tenure in the firm 
and firm’s size, which are not included in the first-stage regression, and are thought to condition wage 
satisfaction without influencing the determination of the wage.  
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10 
In order to confirm the relevance of these constructed notions of Reference wage, we also use the 
subjective declarations of respondents in the survey. We interact the constructed categories of reference 
wage with the intensity of knowledge of other people’s income or the importance of comparisons as 
declared by respondents. Hence, using each of the subjective questions presented in section 2, we estimate 
equation (1) or (2), in which we include an interaction term between the notion of Reference wage and the 
subjective attitude X: 
• Uit = a0.ln(yi) + a1 ln(yi *) + β.Xi + γ.ln(yi *). Xi + … (1’) 
•  Uit = a0.ln(yit) + b1 . [ ln (yit ) – ln(yit*)] + βXi + γ [ln (yit ) – ln(yit*)]. Xi +… (2’) 
We expect that the correlation between reference wage and wage satisfaction be reinforced when 
respondents are aware and self-declaredly interested in the wage of other people, i.e. that the coefficient 
on the interaction term γ be statistically significant. 
Finally, we look at the heterogeneity of the relation between reference wage and wage satisfaction. In 
particular, as suggested by Senik (2004) and Akay and Martinsson (2012), it is likely that wage interactions 
are more of a signal type for young people, and more of a status type for elder workers. Indeed, young 
workers have more uncertainty about their future wages, and can more legitimately nourish positive 
expectations of progression than older workers who are further down in their career and have less to learn 
about their future prospects. In order to test for this effect, we introduce interaction terms involving 
demographic categories and measures of income distribution (median wage and reference wage), following 
the specification of equations (1’) and (2’).  
Beyond the effect of reference wage, it could also be that workers’ utility depends on the general 
distribution of wage instead of the wage of some specific persons. A test of this hypothesis consists in 
including a measure of income distribution, such as the Gini index of income inequality, the standard 
deviation or the inter-quartile range of wage distribution inside the considered group (firm, industry, 
region, etc.). Accordingly, we include aggregate measures of this type in the estimate of wage satisfaction. 
We use OLS estimates of wage satisfaction and other subjective attitudes, the result of which are readily 
interpretable in terms of elasticity. We refer, classically, to Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) for a 
justification of this linear approximation. For robustness, we ran equivalent estimates using an ordered 
probit model; which are available to interested readers. The magnitude and sign of the coefficients are 
similar in both specifications. 
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5. Results 
Within-Establishment Signal Effects 
We start with within-firm indicators of wage distribution. We estimate equation (1) in order to look at the 
impact of the level of median, high and low deciles of intra-firm wage distribution on workers’ wage 
satisfaction, controlling for their own wage.  
My co-workers are rich 
Table 1 shows that for a given level of own wage, workers are all the more satisfied as the median level of 
wage in their firm or their establishment rises! They are also more satisfied when the income level of the 
top quartile (Q3) in their establishment increases (the coefficient on the wage level of the higher quartile 
q3 is 0.085* with a standard error of (0.049). Hence, with the considered measures of yi*, parameter a1 of 
equation (1) is estimated to be positive, suggesting that the signal effect is predominant: workers interpret 
the high wages earned by the median or the top tier workers as a good sign for their own prospects.  
This could also reflect the fact that in firms where wages are higher, employees enjoy a greater sense of 
job stability. Indeed, firms who distribute higher wages may also be also those whose profits and outlook 
are good, hence where the risk of losing one’s job is low. To disentangle the two phenomena, we 
introduce a measure of the dynamic evolution of the firm over the last three years, i.e. the evolution of the 
number of employees, of the hourly wage rate, and of the total wage bill, by establishment, using the panel 
dimension of the DADS. A shown by Table 2, it turns out that these measures are not statistically 
significantly correlated with wage satisfaction and do not affect the association between the median pay 
and satisfaction. 
Does the positive correlation of the median wage and satisfaction hold independently of the position of 
workers in the firm’s wage-grid? Table 3 addresses this question. The coefficient on the establishment’s 
medium wage remains positive and statistically significant, controlling for the position of the respondent 
in the wage distribution of his firm (rows 2-4), and none of the interaction terms between the two 
variables is statistically significant (rows 5-7). We checked that the coefficient on the median level of wage 
inside one’s firm is robust to whether the respondent’s wage is above or below the median: the coefficient 
on the median wage was 0.248 *** (0.068) for those who stand below the median wage and 0.303 *** 
(0.075) for those who were above.   
The top 1% earns too much 
Table 4 offers a more complete picture of the effect of within-firm wage distribution on satisfaction.  It 
displays “reversal thresholds”. Each cell represents a separate estimate of wage satisfaction that includes 
the usual controls. The first cell presents the coefficient on the lowest wage in the firm; it is not 
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statistically significant. The second cell represents the coefficient on the lowest 10% wages in the firm, etc. 
It is only starting with the medium decile (P50) and until the level of the highest quartile (P75) that signal 
effects are playing. Then, the association between the level of the top wages and employees’ satisfaction 
becomes negative starting with the level of the top 5% (P95) and become statistically significantly so with 
the top 1% (P99), or the maximum level of wages (Max). Hence, both signal and status concerns are at 
play inside the firm. As illustrated by Table 5, controlling for the median wage, workers’ satisfaction 
increases with their rank in the wage distribution inside their firm. This effect only becomes statistically 
significant when the median level of wage within establishment is controlled for. This is certainly because 
of the interplay between absolute and relative concerns: Belonging in the top best-paid employees of a 
low-wage firm may be a source of positive utility from the point of view of status, but from the point of 
view of purchasing power, may not be preferable to earning the average wage in a high-wage firm. The 
specification of column 2 allows disentangling absolute income concerns (captured by the medium wage) 
from relative wage concerns (rank). It reveals that the higher the wage level of the top percentile in their 
firm, the less satisfied are employees. We also included indices of within-firm wage inequality in the 
estimate of wage satisfaction. Controlling for the usual covariates, the coefficient on the Gini index of 
wage inequality within establishment was -0.300* (0.148); the coefficient on the normalized standard 
deviation of hourly wage was -0.0390** (0.019); the coefficient on the ratio of extreme deciles 
P90/P10 was -0.001 (0.004) and the coefficient on the interquartile range Q3/Q1: -0.014 (0.030). All these 
measures of inequality were introduced successively and separately. Hence, employees seem to be less 
satisfied with their wage when they work in more unequal firms.  
Firms versus towns 
Of course, we expect the strength of the signal effect to be all the stronger as the wage category vehicles 
an important information content for the employee, i.e. that it refers to a group in which the considered 
employee could potentially belong. To verify this, we run a “placebo regression” of wage satisfaction over 
the medium income in employees’ town (communes in general, and arrondissements for Paris, Lyon, and 
Marseille). The usual expectation is that professional categories of Reference Income are more likely to 
play the role of a signal than non-professional. Unless there is residential segregation, whereby people 
exerting the same occupation live in the same area, there is no reason why the typical income of a person’s 
neighbors should carry any information about that person’s income prospects. On the other hand, it is 
likely that daily interactions create opportunities for income comparisons between neighbors. As discussed 
in Section 2, it is usually found that people’s satisfaction declines with the average income of their 
neighbors, because of relative income concerns. However, there are also certainly positive aspects in living 
in a wealthy neighborhood, such as of local public goods (parks, schools, security, etc.). 
As shown by Table 6, all these expectations are correct: the coefficient on firm’s medium wage is 
statistically significant and positive whereas the coefficient on town’s medium wage is negative and not 
significant. But the last column of Table 6 shows the negative association between satisfaction and the 
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local average income and the positive association between satisfaction and the level of income of the 1% 
richest inhabitants in the area. Obviously, people enjoy living in an area where there are some very rich 
people, but suffer from the comparison with their neighbors. 
Wider orbits of comparisons: a horse-race 
We now turn to wider-orbits of comparison benchmarks. We use the exhaustive DADS dataset in order 
to estimate, for each employee surveyed in SALSA, the typical income of people sharing some of his 
characteristics in the entire population of employees in the private sector, hospitals and the public 
administration. As explained in Section 3, we search for the best specification of this wage equation. Table 
7 reports the results of this horse-race. The first column of Table 7 displays the coefficient a1 on the 
natural logarithm of Reference wage yit*, as in equation (1), i.e. the predicted income for individual i, 
based on the first-stage regression that includes the controls indicated in column 1. For instance, it shows 
that when Reference wage yit* is estimated on the sole basis of occupation dummies (first row, first 
column), the estimated coefficient a1 is statistically significant. The second column shows the same 
coefficient a1 when the second-stage estimate of wage satisfaction includes, as an additional control, the 
median level of wage per establishment. The third column displays the coefficient on the same ln 
Reference wage, when the second-stage estimate of wage satisfaction includes the medium level of wage in 
the establishment as well as the level of wage of the 1% best-paid employees. Note that using the 
specification of equation (2) leads to the exact same results but with the opposite sign.  
It is not true that people compare to same-gender colleagues 
Each row of Table 7 presents one of the main specifications of Reference wage as found in the literature. 
We start (row 1) with a very simple reference wage depending only on occupation (managers, 
intermediate, clerks, workers). Adding age, square age (line 2), the interaction between age and occupation 
(line 3), and a regional fixed-effect (French Départements) increases the magnitude of the coefficient on 
Reference wage. Adding gender (rows 5 and 6) reduced its size as well as its statistical significance 
(compared to row 3). Hence, as opposed to a widespread belief, it does not seem that people compare 
predominantly to same-gender co-workers. Other controls such as industry1, firm fixed-effects, town 
fixed-effects, did not add any statistical significance either. They even sometimes killed the statistical 
significance (city fixed-effects).  
The most powerful specifications are the one presented in row 4, where Reference wage is estimated on 
occupation dummies, age, age square and the interaction between the two series of factors, and a regional 
                                                      
1 We use the classification of the “conventions collectives”, i.e. the level at which collective bargaining between employers 
and trade-unions take place in France concerning wage-grids and working conditions. This grouping is similar to a 
branch-wise classification, but it is more relevant for our study. 
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(French départemetnts) fixed-effect that captures the local dimension of the labor market, or row 8 that 
includes establishment fixed-effects. In summary, people seem to compare their wage to colleagues in the 
same age, occupation, region and establishment.  
Signal and status effects together 
Rows (11 and 12) of Table 7 show respectively the regression of wage satisfaction on Reference wage 
defined as the typical wage of people working in the same establishment (1,754,639 employees working in 
2765 establishments, with an average of 635 employees per establishment) and in the same firm (5,653,337 
employees working in 2502 firms with an average of 2260 employees per firms). In these specifications, 
the wage equation is estimated within each establishment or within each firm, instead of including an 
establishment fixed-effect as in specification 8, or a firm fixed-effect as in specification 9. The coefficient 
a1 is statistically insignificant unless the median level of wage in the establishment (or firm) is introduced 
in the regression. We interpret this as another sign that both signal and status effects play inside firms: 
workers enjoy working in high-wage firms and also experience relative income concerns. So when only 
income gaps are introduced in the estimate, the two effects play in opposite direction and the net effect is 
too weak to be statistically significant; but once the medium level of wage is introduced, the two effects 
can be disentangled and relative income gaps attract a statistically significant coefficient. Therefore, once 
we control for signal effects by including the establishment median wage, the first stage regression that has 
the strongest negative impact on wage satisfaction is given by row 8: -0.197*(0.080). It is based on 
occupation, age, age squared, the interaction of age and occupation and an establishment fixed effect. We 
will use this notion of reference wage in the following tables.  
Wage comparisons are upwards 
We also ran estimates of wage satisfaction following specification (3), and found that the wage gap [ln (yit) 
- ln (yit*)] attracts a statistically significant positive coefficient only for employees who stand below their 
Reference wage (yit <yit*): the coefficient is then equal to 0.529***(0.126) whereas it is of -0.071 (0.112) 
for employees whose wage is above the level of yit* (based on the specification of row 8 in Table 7). This 
confirms the usual intuition that relative income concerns are more powerful when they act as relative 
deprivation than as overlook. 
Robustness 
Table 8 presents estimates of alternative measures of satisfaction. Each line corresponds to a separate 
regression. The first column presents the coefficient on the medium level of wage in the establishment; 
the second column the coefficient on the top 1% wage and the third column the coefficient on Relative 
income defined as in row 8 of Table 7. The three measures are included in each regression. 
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Explicit inter-firm comparisons 
The first row of Table 8 reproduces the results of row 8 (third column) in Table 7. The second row shows 
that, controlling for the actual wage of an employee, the higher the level of his establishment’s medium 
wage, the lower the level of wage that he deems “normal”, i.e. the lower the additional wage that he is 
aspiring to. This non-trivial effect suggests that employees evaluate their wage satisfaction with respect to 
their establishment: if people are well-paid in the establishment, they are satisfied with their own wage. 
Then, the higher the Reference wage of a respondent, the higher the wage he aspires to. Identically, the 
higher the level of pay of the top 1% best-paid employees in the establishment, the higher the level of 
wage that employees judge they ought to be paid “normally”. This is consistent with the relative 
deprivation effects mentioned above.  
In the same spirit, row 3 of Table 8 shows that the higher the medium level of wages in the establishment, 
the more likely it is that employees declare that that their firm pays well as compared to other firms in the 
same sector, and the less likely it is that they declare that they consider quitting their job (row 4) and that 
this is in order to find a better paid job (row 5). 
Placebo 
The other estimates presented in Table 8, in rows 7-11, play the role of placebo regressions, as they 
display the association between Reference wage, top 1% wage and Medium wage on the one hand, and 
the way employees judge their wage level with regards to their needs, education, tenure and effort, on the 
other hand. Apart for diploma, which may be related to a notion of reference group, such as schoolmates 
(row 11), most of these correlations are not statistically significant.  In the same way (7th row of Table 8), 
neither of the three income distribution measures (medium wage, reference wage and top 1% wage) 
attracts a statistically significant coefficient in the estimate of “I like my work”, i.e. the question whether 
employees like what they do during their work.  This shows that the association between other people’s 
wage and individual satisfaction is not just due to some unobserved omitted variable that would jointly 
influence them: if it were the case, the omitted variable would also influence other dimensions of 
satisfaction and attitudes.  
Interactions between constructed Reference wage and knowledge of other people’s wage 
The constructed notions of reference wage should be all the more strongly associated with wage 
satisfaction as employees are aware of the income of their peers and attach importance to comparisons. 
They should also be associated with “voice” or “exit” intentions (Hirschman, 1970), i.e. with behavioral 
reactions of employees depending on the degree of their wage satisfaction. We thus expect the interaction 
of Reference wage variables with such subjective perceptions to be associated with wage satisfaction. 
Table 9 displays the results of these tests. Each cell corresponds to a separate regression. 
ha
ls
hs
-0
09
07
26
8,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 2
1 
No
v 
20
13
 
16 
Column 1 of Table 9 presents the coefficient on each of these subjective perceptions (main effect), 
controlling for median wage and the usual controls.  It shows (rows 1-4) that wage satisfaction is lower for 
people who are aware about the wage of their colleagues and manager (but not their CEOs or other 
people in the same profession, where the coefficients are not statistically significant). Wage satisfaction is 
also lower for those who attach more importance to comparisons (rows 5-10).  It is higher for people who 
think they earn more than their reference group and, symmetrically, lower for those who think that they 
earn less. Acknowledging any comparison benchmark (row 10) amongst the ones that are proposed, i.e 
colleagues in the same firm, in the same profession, former schoolmates, family members, friends or the 
minimum wage), attracts a negative coefficient whose magnitude is equivalent to a fall in own wage by 
40% (in terms of the 2008 wage declared by the firm in DADS).  
Column 2 of Table 9 presents the interactions of subjective comparisons (in rows) with the median level 
of wage in one’s establishment. For instance, the intersection of row 1 and column 2 shows that 
controlling for one’s own wage, being aware of the wage of some of my colleagues amplifies the positive 
association between the level of medium wage in my firm and my satisfaction (by 0.231). Declaring that 
the comparison with one’s colleagues is important raises the effect of medium wage (by 0.164). The two 
last rows show that the association between the median level of within-establishment wage and 
satisfaction is higher for those who earn less than the colleagues with whom they compare, and lower for 
those who think they earn more. All these results are consistent with a signal effect whereby the medium 
level of wage in one’s establishment is a source of greater satisfaction, especially for those who are more 
likely to be aware of it (because they are interested in other people’s wage) and for those who look 
forward to filling the gap with their Reference wage group.  
Column 3 of Table 9 displays the interaction between subjective perceptions and the top 1% wage within 
the establishment. Unsurprisingly, the negative effect of the level of the top wage is amplified for 
employees who declare that they know the wage of their top-managers, as well as for people who compare 
to colleagues who earn less (that we could plausibly interpret as a shared feeling of relative deprivation).  
Column 4 of Table 9 shows the interaction between subjective perceptions and the gap between one’s 
own wage and one’s Reference wage, controlling for the usual controls as well as medium establishment 
income. Here, the coefficient on the interaction is positive and statistically significant for employees who 
acknowledge that compare to their colleagues in their firm. It is also negative and statistically significant 
for those who declare that they earn less than their Reference group, but not significant for those who 
earn more than their reference group. As expected, the coefficients on the interaction terms are not 
statistically significant for those who declare that they compare to their family members, friends, former 
schoolmates or to the minimum wage. This is in line with the fact that Reference income is a professional 
category: there is no reason why the wage gap between employees and their professional group should be 
related to satisfaction via comparisons to non-professional groups. 
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Overall, these interactions confirm the existence of both relative income concerns and signal effects 
within-establishment. These two types of income interactions are reinforced by the awareness of 
employees about the wage of their colleagues, and importance that they grant to this information.  
Heterogeneity 
As explained in Section 3, we expect the social interactions that we uncovered to be more or less strong 
depending on the groups of the population. Table 10 shows the coefficients on interactions of a series of 
socio-demographic variables (in rows) and comparison benchmarks (in columns), controlling for the main 
effects of these variables, as well as the usual controls. The first column suggests that, as expected, signal 
effects are more powerful -and status effects less powerful- for the young. This is consistent with the idea 
that young people have more to learn about other people’s wages than elder workers, whose career is 
already partly behind them and whose future prospects are less uncertain. Both status and signal effect 
seem to be stronger for women than for men, suggesting that women pay more attention to the pay of 
their colleagues. Finally, status effects are weaker for managers and civil servants whose careers are 
probably less uncertain. 
6. Conclusions 
Based on a matched employer-employee dataset, this study provides evidence of the association between 
other people’s wage and individuals’ satisfaction with their pay. Within establishment, we uncover two 
types of effect: signal effects and status effects. On the one hand, for a given level of their own pay, 
employees are more satisfied with their wage when they work in a well-paying firm. On the other hand, 
they also display relative income concerns: their satisfaction depends on the gap between their own wage 
and some Reference wage. It also decreases with the level of the top 1% wage in their firm. Signal effects 
are more widespread amongst the young. The two types of effects are magnified by the fact that people 
are aware of the wage of their colleagues in their establishment and by the self-declared importance of 
comparisons with their colleagues. The association between relative income gaps and wage-satisfaction is 
asymmetric: people who compare to higher benchmarks are less happy than those who compare to 
colleagues who earn less or as much as them. Then, the association between wage satisfaction and relative 
income gap is only statistically significant for those who declare that they stand below their Reference 
wage.  
This paper contributes to the discussion about transparency of pay within firms. It shows that awareness 
of other people’s job exert a negative effect on wage satisfaction and other dimensions of wellbeing at 
work and engagement, via the channel of relative deprivation. However, signal effects are also powerful, 
and working with well-paid colleagues exerts a positive motivation effect. The limit of such signal effects 
seems to be reached by the extreme high-end of wage distribution: the level of pay of the top 1% of the 
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payroll. In view of this result, it seems that the optimal route for a firm is to allow transparency and limit 
the skewness of the wage distribution. 
This new result echoes recent discussions about the rise in inequality. During the last 15 years, France, like 
many developed countries (Atkinson et al., 2011) has been confronted with a sharp rise of its highest 
wages, among the top 1% and even more so among the top 0.1%, especially within the financial sector 
(Landais, 2009; Godechot, 2012). This global trend seems to be a source of wage dissatisfaction, another 
component of the “price of inequality”(Stiglitz, 2012). 
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Tables  
 
Estimates 
 
 
Table 1. Signal Effects. OLS Estimates of Wage Satisfaction 
 
Wage Satisfaction 
Median wage level inside the firm (log) 0.152 * 
(0.064) 
Median wage level inside the establishment (log) 0.147 * 
(0.062) 
Q3 inside the establishment (log) 0.085 * 
(0.049) 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1.  
Other controls: all controls of Table A5, i.e. gender, nationality, age, age square, education, tenure, tenure 
square, public/private sector, log of firm size, log of hourly wage declared by employer in DADS, log of 
hourly wage declared by employee in SALSA.  
Each cell corresponds to a separate regression.  
 
 
 
Table 2. Impact of the Median Wage Level Controlling for the 2006-2008  
Evolution Inside each Firm.  
OLS Estimates of Wage Satisfaction 
 
 Wage Satisfaction 
Median wage level inside the firm (log) 0.131 *  
(0.064) 
0.145 *  
(0.065) 
0.131 *  
(0.065) 
0.131 * 
(0.065) 
Evolution of the average hourly wage of the firm   -0.093 
(0.058) 
  
Evolution of the headcount of the firm   0.003 
(0.004) 
 
Evolution of the total wage bill of the firm    0.00005 
(0.0001) 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1.  
n=2744 (the population is restricted to employees in firms where evolutions are computable). 
Other controls: all controls of Table A5, i.e. gender, nationality, age, age square, education, tenure, tenure 
square, public/private sector, log of firm size, log of hourly wage declared by employer in DADS, log of 
hourly wage declared by employee in SALSA.  
Each column corresponds to a separate regression.  
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Table 3. Wage Satisfaction and the Median Wage Level Depending on the Position of the 
Respondent inside the Establishment. OLS Estimates of Wage Satisfaction 
Wage Satisfaction 
Median wage level inside the establishment (log) 0.223* 
(0.132) 
Respondent belongs to Q2 (log) -0.553 
(0.375) 
Respondent belongs to Q3 (log) -0.302 
(0.376) 
Respondent belongs to Q4 (log) 0.006 
(0.362) 
Respondent belongs to Q2*MEDIAN (log) 0.240 
(0.158) 
Respondent belongs to Q3*MEDIAN (log) 0.184 
(0.161) 
Respondent belongs to Q4*MEDIAN (log) 0.091 
(0.158) 
R2 15% 
Number observations 2842 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1. Other controls: all controls of Table A5, i.e. gender, nationality, age, age 
square, education, tenure, tenure square, public/private sector, log of firm size, log of hourly wage 
declared by employer in DADS, log of hourly wage declared by employee in SALSA.  
 
Table 4.  Reversal Threshold. OLS Estimates of Wage Satisfaction over Alternative 
Measures of Wage Distribution inside Each Establishment 
Wage Satisfaction 
Smallest wage in the establishment (log) 0.0001 
(0.012) 
P1 in the establishment (log) -0.001 
(0.018) 
P5 in the establishment (log) 0.024 
(0.023) 
P10 in the establishment (log)  0.018 
(0.036) 
P25 in the establishment (log) 0.164* 
(0.069) 
P50 in the establishment (log) 0.147 * 
(0.060) 
P75 in the establishment (log) 0.085 * 
(0.050) 
P90 in the establishment (log) 0.013 
(0.040) 
P95 in the establishment (log) -0.004 
(0.033) 
P99 in the establishment (log) -0.052* 
(0.025) 
Highest wage in the establishment (log) -0.040 ** 
(0.015) 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1. Other controls: all controls of Table A5.   
Each cell corresponds to a separate regression of wage satisfaction over the indicated measure.  
ha
ls
hs
-0
09
07
26
8,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 2
1 
No
v 
20
13
 
23 
Table 5. Relative Concerns inside Establishments.  
OLS Estimates of Wage Satisfaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1.  
Other controls: all controls of Table A5.   
Each column corresponds to a separate regression of wage satisfaction over measures of the wage 
distribution in the establishment (geographic definition). 
 
Table 6. Wage Satisfaction and the Effect of the Median Level of Wage within 
Establishment versus Town. OLS Estimates of Wage Satisfaction 
 
Wage Satisfaction 
 Inside one’s Firm Inside one’s Town 
Median Wage Level inside Firm or Town (log) 0.152* 
(0.064) 
0.278*** 
(0.072) 
-0.194 
(0.165) 
-0.364* 
(0.189) 
P99 Wage Level inside Firm or Town  (log)  -0.109*** 
(0.029) 
 0.102* 
(0.056) 
   N 2842 2842 2840 2840 
   R2 14% 15% 14% 14% 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1.  
Other controls: all controls of Table A5.   
Each column corresponds to a separate regression of wage satisfaction. 
 
Wage Satisfaction 
   
Median Wage Level inside Establishment (log)  0.356*** 
(0.082) 
Salary Rank in Establishment 0.088 
(0.059) 
0.307*** 
(0.078) 
ha
ls
hs
-0
09
07
26
8,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 2
1 
No
v 
20
13
 
24 
Table 7. A Horse Race between Different Notions of Reference Group 
OLS Estimates of Wage Satisfaction 
 
 Wage Satisfaction 
  Coefficient on ln(yi*) as in equation (2) 
  
Specification of the First-Stage Estimate 
List of included controls: 
Classical 
controls 
Classical controls 
and controlling 
for establishment 
wage median 
Classical controls and 
controlling for 
establishment wage 
median and P99 
1 Occupation -0.131* 
(0.069) 
-0.120* 
(0.069) 
-0.115* 
(0.069) 
2 Occupation + age + age2 -0.141* 
(0.073) 
-0.129* 
(0.074) 
-0.123* 
(0.074) 
3 Occupation +age+age2 + Occupation *age + 
Occupation*age2 
-0.174 * 
(0.068) 
-0.162 * 
(0.068) 
-0.157* 
(0.069) 
4 Occupation +age+age2 + Occupation *age + 
Occupation*age2 + Region (département) 
-0.188** 
(0.069) 
-0.181** 
(0.069) 
-0.175* 
(0.069) 
5 Occupation + age + age2 + Occupation*age + 
Occupation*age2 + sex 
-0.163 * 
(0.069) 
-0.150 * 
(0.069) 
-0.146* 
(0.069) 
6 Occupation + age + age2 + Occupation*age + 
Occupation*age2 + sex + sex*age + sex*age2 
-0.163 * 
(0.069) 
-0.151 * 
(0.069) 
-0.147* 
(0.069) 
7 Occupation + age + age2 + Occupation *age + 
Occupation*age2 + industry 
-0.134* 
(0.069) 
-0.143* 
(0.069) 
-0.132* 
(0.069) 
8 Occupation + age + age2 + Occupation*age 
+ Occupation*age2 + Establishment 
-0.080 
(0.071) 
-0.197* 
(0.080) 
-0.166 * 
(0.080) 
9 Occupation + age + age2 + Occupation*age + 
Occupation*age2 + firm fixed-effect 
-0.059 
(0.070) 
-0.148* 
(0.076) 
-0.123 
(0.076) 
10 Age + age2 + city fixed-effect -0.110 
(0.167) 
-0.170 
(0.169) 
-0.161 
(0.169) 
11 Occupation + ln(age) by establishment (##) -0.080 
(0.071) 
-0.151 * 
(0.075) 
-0.130* 
(0.076) 
12 Occupation + ln(age) + ln(age)* Occupation by 
establishment (##) 
-0.091 
(0.073) 
-0.157 * 
(0.077) 
-0.134* 
(0.077) 
13 Occupation + ln(age) by firm (###) -0.102 
(0.070) 
-0.154 * 
(0.073) 
-0.137* 
(0.073) 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1. Other controls: all controls of Table A5.   
This table displays the coefficient on Reference Income y* in the estimate of wage satisfaction, as in 
equation (1), depending on the definition of Reference income.  
Each cell corresponds to a separate regression.  
First-stage regressions are estimated on the entire population of employees in the DADS (2008); 
n=33,149,444 unless otherwise specified.  
In rows 11 and 12 (##), first-stage estimates of Reference income are run by establishment (i.e. people 
working in the same local unit). The number of observation is thus restricted to the sample of workers in 
the same establishment as SALSA’s respondents (n=1,754,639). 
In row 13 (###) first-stage estimates of Reference income are run by legal firm (i.e. people working in 
the same firm, but possibly in different locations). The number of observation is thus restricted to the 
sample of workers in the same firm as SALSA’s respondents (n=5,653,337).s 
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Table 8. Robustness. OLS Estimates of Other Work Attitudes 
 
 
Explained variable 
 
Establishment 
Median (log) 
Establishment 
P99 (log) 
Reference 
Wage y* (log) 
N R2 
1. Wage satisfaction 0.310* * * 
(0.075) 
-0.088*** 
(0.027) 
-0.166 * 
(0.080) 
2842 0.15 
2. Level of wage considered “normal” for this 
type of job 
-0.110** 
(0.036) 
0.048*** 
(0.013) 
0.160*** 
(0.039) 
2638 0.60 
3. My firm pays better than other firms 0.292*** 
(0.076) 
-0.102*** 
(0.028) 
0.006 
(0.083) 
2580 0.10 
4. I considers quitting my firm  -.086* 
(0.042) 
-0.004 
(0.015) 
0.084* 
(0.044) 
2781 0.05 
5. I want to quit for a better wage -.055 * 
(0.031) 
0.007 
(0.011) 
0.013 
(0.033) 
2759 0.04 
6. Asked supervisor for a pay rise -.053 
(0.054) 
0.052** 
(0.020) 
0.055 
(0.058) 
2801 0.06 
7. I Like my work -0.082 
(0.083) 
-0.012 
(0.031) 
0.026 
(0.090) 
2839 0.04 
8. My wage is enough to cover needs -0.112 
(0.091) 
0.030 
(0.033) 
-0.027 
(0.097) 
2815 0.23 
9. My wage corresponds to my productivity 0.104 
(0.054) 
-0.011 
(0.024) 
0.040 
(0.071) 
2733 0.05 
10. My wage corresponds to my experience 0.059 
(0.056) 
-0.018 
(0.021) 
0.059 
(0.060) 
2777 0.12 
11. My wage corresponds to my diploma 0.071 
(0.065) 
-0.037 
(0.024) 
0.168* 
(0.071) 
2586 0.24 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1. Other controls: all controls of Table A5.  
All variables reordered in the direction of increasing satisfaction.  
The number of observations varies slightly due to different non-response to subjective satisfaction 
questions.  
One row per regression.  
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Table 9. Interactions between Within-Establishment Wage Distribution and Subjective 
Importance of Comparisons.  
OLS Estimates of Wage Satisfaction 
 
Wage Satisfaction 
 Main effect Interaction 
with 
Establishment 
Median (log) 
Interaction with 
Establishment 
P99 (median 
controlled) (log) 
Interaction with 
Deviation to 
Reference Wage 
(median 
controlled) (log) 
Subjective perception (Q) Q Q*Median Q * P99 Q*(yi-y*) 
I know (approximately) the wage of:     
1.   - some of my colleagues in my firm -0.100*** 
(0.029) 
0.185* 
(0.108) 
0.005 
(0.048) 
0.116 
(0.138) 
2.   - my managers (supervisors)  -0.043 
(0.028) 
-0.056 
(0.103) 
-0.045 
(0.051) 
0.044 
(0.124) 
3.   – the top-managers of my firm 0.019 
(0.033) 
-0.376** 
(0.114) 
-0.177** 
(0.059) 
-0.041 
(0.140) 
4.   - persons holding same job in other firms -0.086 
(0.026) 
0.093 
(0.097) 
-0.185 
(0.043) 
-0.131 
(0.118) 
It is important to compare my wage to:     
5.   - colleagues in same job -0.171*** 
(0.026) 
0.164* 
(0.099) 
-0.005 
(0.043) 
0.260* 
(0.119) 
6.   - family members -0.093*** 
(0.025) 
0.348*** 
(0.096) 
0.129** 
(0.042) 
0.050 
(0.117) 
7.   - former schoolmates -0.137*** 
(0.034) 
0.009 
(0.119) 
-0.072 
(0.056) 
-0.046 
(0.140) 
8.   - friends -0.137*** 
(0.026) 
0.258** 
(0.097) 
0.010 
(0.043) 
0.152 
(0.117) 
9.   - the French minimum wage (SMIC)  -0.167*** 
(0.025) 
0.057 
(0.098) 
0.031 
(0.043) 
0.172 
(0.119) 
10. - any group amongst colleagues, family, 
schoolmates or friends 
-0.161*** 
(0.028) 
0.330** 
(0.106) 
0.074 
(0.048) 
0.227* 
(0.129) 
11. I compare to colleagues who earn more  -0.356*** 
(0.032) 
0.238* 
(0.122) 
0.111* 
(0.050) 
0.058 
(0.148) 
12. I compare to colleagues who earn less 0. 416*** 
(0.039) 
-0.440*** 
(0.127) 
-0.137* 
(0.058) 
-0.511** 
(0.164) 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1. Other controls: all controls of Table A5.  
Each cell corresponds to a separate regression.  
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Table 10.  Heterogeneity in the Relationship between Within-EstablishmentWage 
Distribution and Satisfaction.  
OLS Estimates of Wage Satisfaction 
 
Wage Satisfaction 
 Interaction with 
Establishment 
Median (log) 
Interaction with 
Establishment 
P99 (median 
controlled) (log) 
Interaction with 
deviation to Reference 
Wage (median 
controlled) (log) 
Social characteristics (S) S * Median S * P99 S * (yi-y*) 
Female 0.169* 
(0.099) 
0.072* 
(0.043) 
0.196* 
(0.118) 
Young (<35) 0.330** 
(0.113) 
0.105* 
(0.046) 
-0.088 
(0.139) 
Old (>50) -0.356** 
(0.108) 
-0.151** 
(0.050) 
0.012 
(0.127) 
Small firm (<20) -0.129 
(0.105) 
-0.016 
(0.046) 
-0.059 
(0.125) 
Manager -0.135 
(0.123) 
-0.067 
(0.070) 
-0.279* 
(0.137) 
Civil Servant (local or hospital) -0.097 
(0.178) 
-0.036 
(0.069) 
-0.246* 
(0.138) 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1. Other controls: all controls of Table A5.  
Each cell corresponds to a separate regression.  
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Appendix 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Salsa sample was randomly extracted in 2008 from the DADS Panel (all wage-earners working in the 
private sector or as civil servants in local administration and hospital) in 2006. People living in ten French 
regions of France were selected. Civil servants and people belonging to the upper decile of the national 
wage distribution were oversampled. The survey took place in 2009. 
 
Table A1. Wage Levels in the (unweighted) Regression Sample of the SALSA Survey 
 
 Mean SD P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P99 N 
Hourly wages          
Hourly wage in SALSA 
subsample (declared by 
employers) 
12.47 6.89 7.62 8.65 10.51 13.86 19.49 37.54 2842 
Hourly wage in the entire 
DADS (declared by employers) 
12.33 88.56 7.10 8.05 9.73 13.13 19.27 43.24 2 146 689 
Hourly wage in the entire 
DADS restricted to regions 
investigated (declared by 
employers) 
11.82 112.48 7.10 8.02 9.54 12.56 17.71 37.40 826 323 
Salsa 2009 
Hourly wage (declared by the 
worker) 
10.74 6.60 6.83 7.68 9.28 12.00 15.80 30.72 2842 
Monthly wages          
Salsa 2009 monthly wage 
(declared by the worker) 
1693 1062 914 1200 1472.8 2000 2700 5500 2842 
Salsa 2008 monthly wage (firm 
declared) 
(calculated on the basis of 
yearly wage/12) 
1693.5 1167 634.3 1132.4 1498.1 2007.2 2806 5916.3 2842 
Yearly wages          
Yearly wage: country average 16597 21586 1413 5934 14823 21560 31079 74807 2 146 689 
Yearly wage: average in regions 
of SALSA survey 
15743 17304 1444 66003 14693 20941 29249 65318 826 323 
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Table A2. Descriptive Statistics (Regression Sample). SALSA (2009) 
 
Variable N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Wage Satisfaction 2842 2.48 0.72 1 4 
Female 2842 0.49 0.50 0 1 
French 2842 0.97 0.18 0 1 
Diploma: CE or less 2842 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Diploma: CAP, BEP, BEPC 2842 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Diploma: BAC (i.e. end of high school diploma) 2842 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Diploma: BAC+2 2842 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Diploma: BAC+3 and 4 2842 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Diploma: BAC+5 and more 2842 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Civil servant 2842 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Age 2842 42.05 10.42 19 65 
Age² 2842 1876.57 873.10 361 4225 
Tenure within the firm 2842 12.25 9.84 0 43 
Seniority² 2842 246.80 338.58 0 1849 
Log of Size of the firm 2842 4.91 2.39 0 8.52 
2009 self declared Hourly wage 2842 10.74 6.60 0.54 195.85 
2008 DADS hourly wage 2842 12.47 6.88 3.43 115.56 
Self-declared hourly wage 2009 (log) 2842 2.29 0.38 -0.62 5.28 
Firm-declared hourly wage 2008 (log) 2842 2.43 0.39 1.23 4.75 
Establishment Median Hourly Wage (log) 2842 2.35 0.26 1.27 4.36 
Establishment P99 Hourly Wage (log) 2842 3.32 0.60 1.79 7.20 
Predicted Reference Wage = Occupation +age+age2 + 
Occupation*age + Occupation*age2 2842 2.41 0.32 1.99 3.64 
Predicted Reference Wage = Occupation + age + age2 + 
Occupation*age + Occupation*age2 + Department FE 2842 2.40 0.31 1.98 3.62 
Predicted Reference Wage = Occupation+age+age2 + 
Occupation *age + Occupation *age2 + Establishment FE 2842 2.41 0.34 1.44 4.75 
Log of Wage considered as ‘Normal’ 2638 7.48 0.48 4.09 10.13 
I like my work 2839 3.47 0.75 1 4 
My wage covers my needs 2815 2.46 0.91 1 4 
My wage corresponds to my contribution 2733 1.45 0.58 1 3 
My firm pays well 2580 2.05 0.68 1 3 
My wage corresponds to my experience 2777 1.40 0.53 1 3 
My wage corresponds to my diploma 2586 1.75 0.64 1 3 
Wants to quit his job 2842 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Wants to quit in order to get higher wage 2842 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Asked supervisor for a wage rise 2842 0.45 0.50 0 1 
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Table A3. Subjective Questions in SALSA (2009) 
 
Concerning your wage, would you say that you are:  
   Very satisfied 4.2% 
   Rather satisfied 49.3% 
   Rather unsatisfied 37.2% 
   Very unsatisfied 9.4% 
Do you like what you do during your work?  
   Yes, almost always 58.6% 
   Yes, most of the time 31.2% 
   Yes, sometimes 6.9% 
   In general, no 3.2% 
   Refuse to answer or don’t know 0.1% 
Is you wage sufficient to cover your needs?  
   No, your wage is not sufficient 18.7% 
   You just have enough to pay for your house, your food and your clothes 25.6% 
   You can live on it and even afford some expenditure for leisure 44.7% 
   You are comfortable with your income  10.1% 
   Refuse or don’t know 1.0% 
In your opinion, does your wage correspond to what you bring to your employer?  
   Yes 34.2% 
   No, it is insufficient with regards to what I contribute to my employer 57.6% 
   No, my contribution to my employer is lower than my wage (only if spontaneous answer) 4.4% 
   Refuse or don’t know 3.8% 
Would you say that, as compared to other firms in your industry, wages in your own firm:  
   Are good 23.4% 
   Are is in the average 48.2% 
   Are rather low 19.1% 
   Refuse or don’t know 9.2% 
Do you consider that your wage:  
   Is rather high, given your professional experience 2.0% 
   Is correct, given your professional experience 35.0% 
   Is rather low, your professional experience 60.7% 
   Refuse or don’t know 2.3% 
Do you consider that your wage:  
   Is rather high given your level of education 10.0% 
   Is correct given your level of education 47.9% 
   Is rather low given your level of education 33.1% 
   Refuse or don’t know 9.0% 
During the last 5 years, did you take a personal action with one of your managers in order to ask 
for a pay rise, a promotion, or to ask him to help you to obtain one? 
 
   Yes 44.7% 
   No 53.9% 
   Refuse or don’t know 1.4% 
Today, do you plan to quit your job voluntarily?  
   Yes 16.4% 
   No 81.5% 
   Refuse or don’t know 2.2% 
If so, why? (n=466) #  
   Essentially to obtain a higher pay 49.4% 
   It is not for the wage  46.1% 
   Refuse or don’t know 4.5% 
Do people to which you compare your wage generally earn: (n=2044) ##  
   More than you 37.9% 
   As much as you 29.5% 
   Less than you 18.8% 
   Refuse or don’t know 13.8% 
Note : n=2842, except for # and ##.   
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Table A4. Subjective Questions (continued) in SALSA 
 
 Yes No Refuse or don’t 
know or without 
object 
Amongst the following groups of persons in your professional 
surrounding, are there any about whom you know, 
approximately, how much they earn (including premium and 
bonuses)? 
   
   - Some colleagues exerting the same function as you do inside 
your firm? (with a margin of 5%)  
66.1% 28.2% 5.8% 
   - Some of your own direct managers (with a margin of error of 
15%) 
29.6% 70.0% 0.4% 
   - The top managers of your firm (with a margin of 30%) 19.3% 80.3% 0.4% 
   - Persons doing the same job in other firms 41.4% 56.3% 2.3% 
When you think about your wage, do you also compare it to 
what other people earn, for example: 
   
   - Current colleagues exerting the same occupation as yourself? 49.6% 47.4% 3.0% 
   - Friends of yours? 44.3% 54.8% 0.9% 
   - Former schoolmates? 20.8% 66.9% 12.3% 
   - Family members?  47.8% 51.4% 0.8% 
   - At least one of these (Comp1) 71.9% 28.1%w . 
Have you recently (over the last 6 months) compared your wage to 
the minimum wage (SMIC)? 
40.9% 56.1% 3.0% 
Note : n=2842. 
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Basic regressions 
 
Table A5. Basic satisfaction model OLS Estimate of Wage Satisfaction 
 
Wage Satisfaction 
Female -0.005 
(0.027) 
French 0.005 
(0.069) 
Diploma: CAP, BEP, BEPC 0.004 
(0.043) 
Diploma: BAC -0.0066 
(0.050) 
Diploma: BAC+2 -0.053 
(0.052) 
Diploma: BAC+3/4 -0.131* 
(0.065) 
Diploma: BAC+5&+ -0.249*** 
(0.066) 
Hospital or local civil servant -0.020 
(0.032) 
Age -0.040** 
(0.010) 
Age² 0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
Tenure -0.017*** 
(0.005) 
Tenure ² 0.0004** 
(0.0001) 
Log of firm size -0.038 *** 
(0.005) 
Log of 2009 hourly wage (declared by employee) 0.528*** 
(0.053) 
Log of 2008 hourly wage (declared by firm) 0.3192*** 
(0.055) 
Intercept 1.789*** 
(0.224) 
R2 0.14 
Number observations 2842 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1.  
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Table A6.   Our Preferred Wage Equation OLS Estimate using DADS 
 
Wage Equation 
Age 0.019 
(0.00004) 
Age² -.00017 
(0.0000006) 
Omitted occupation: Clerks  
Entrepreneur 0.355 
(0.0014) 
Manager -.783 
(0.002) 
Intermediate -.380 
(0.002) 
Blue Collar Worker -.139 
(0.001) 
Age*Entrepreneur 0.025 
(0.006) 
Age*Manager 0.057 
(0.0001) 
Age*Intermediate 0.026 
(0.00008) 
Age*Worker 0.008 
(0.00007) 
Age²*Entrepreneur -.0002 
(0.000006) 
Age²*Manager -.0005 
(0.000001) 
Age²*Intermediate -.0002 
(0.000001) 
Age²*Worker -.0001 
(0.0000009) 
N 33 149 444 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1. 
Establishment fixed-effects included.  
Sources : DADS exhaustive files (2008) 
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